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<rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" version="2.0"><channel><description>Direct access to factual information related to the lawful foreign surveillance activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Created at the direction of the President of the United States and maintained by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Follow @IContheRecord
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!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^https:/.test(d.location)?'https':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');CONTENT:- Official Statements- Declassified Documents- Testimony- Speeches &amp; Interviews- Fact Sheets- Oversight &amp; Compliance- Video- IC BudgetHOT TOPICS:- Civil Liberties- FISA- FISC- Section 215- Section 702THEIR OWN WORDS:- Glenn Gerstell, GC, NSA- Becky Richards, CLPO, NSA(Former IC Officials)-  James Clapper, DNI-  Keith Alexander, Dir. NSA- John Inglis, Dep. Dir. NSA- Robert Litt,  GC, ODNI- Rajesh De,  GC, NSA- John Delong, CD, NSA- Mike Rogers, Dir. NSA
- Rick Ledgett, Dep. Dir. NSA
- Alex Joel, CLPT, ODNI



NOTE:  Before searching here on Tumblr, try the IC on the Record Database at Intel.gov for a new and improved full text search of all posted documents and statements. </description><title>IC ON THE RECORD</title><generator>Tumblr (3.0; @icontherecord)</generator><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/</link><item><title>Release of the 20th Joint Assessment of Section 702...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/f9e717b98cfb156e343ab6cf11a0f87d/0d2f213acc191c8b-da/s500x750/5cfd8c3ec36c8fef0566f1f77c4cc1b20574e06f.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Release of the 20&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Joint Assessment of Section 702 Compliance&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;April 2, 2021&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today, the DNI, in consultation with the Department of Justice, is releasing in redacted form the 20&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the then Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (“Joint Assessment”). This Joint Assessment covers the timeframe of December 2017 – May 2018. The DNI is releasing this semiannual assessment proactively, in keeping with the &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ppd-28/FINAL%20Transparency_poster%20v1.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the Intelligence Community &lt;i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which was in effect during the reporting period for this 20&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Joint Assessment, required the Attorney General and the DNI to assess compliance with Section 702 procedures over each six-month period and to submit such assessments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and relevant congressional committees.  A joint team of experts (the Joint Oversight Team) from DOJ and ODNI conduct these assessments.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Joint Assessments describe the extensive measures the Government undertakes to ensure compliance with FISC-approved targeting and minimization procedures for Section 702; to accurately identify, record and correct errors; to take responsive actions to remove any erroneously obtained data; and to minimize the chances that mistakes will recur.  As was the case in past Joint Assessments, the Joint Oversight Team found in the 20&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Joint Assessment that the agencies continued to implement the procedures in a manner that reflected a focused and concerted effort by IC personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In this semiannual assessment, DOJ and ODNI note that two types of compliance incidents drove the increase in the overall compliance incident rate to 4.39%.  Certain of the compliance incidents described in this assessment, including those regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) queries discussed below, have been described in other materials previously released to the public, most notably, the FISC’s &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISC_Opin_18Oct18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;October 2018 opinion &lt;i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt; addressing the Government’s annual certification of its Section 702 program.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As described in this and prior semiannual assessments, this overall compliance incident rate remains an imperfect proxy insofar as the rate compares the total number of compliance incidents (regardless of their cause) to the average number of tasked facilities (which may be unrelated to the number of certain types of compliance incidents, such as the number of times the acquired data was disseminated or queried erroneously).  To better promote oversight and inform the public’s understanding of compliance trends and their potential to affect privacy and civil liberties, this assessment therefore also includes narrative descriptions of compliance incidents and provides an additional metric that is specific to the compliance incident rate for National Security Agency (NSA) targeting decisions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the first category of incidents, one office in the NSA misunderstood how one of NSA’s tasking tools worked and did not appropriately review multiple accounts prior to tasking, which resulted in numerous accounts being incorrectly tasked.  The erroneously tasked accounts were detasked and the information collected from these taskings was purged.  After becoming aware of the incidents, NSA issued additional training to its personnel about the tasking requirements on the use of its tasking tools.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The second category of incidents involved misapplication by FBI personnel of the query standard in the FBI querying procedures.  Two events, each involving large numbers of queries conducted using FBI’s “batch query” tool (which allows FBI personnel to run numerous identifiers simultaneously), resulted in approximately 98% of the FBI’s compliance incidents. These two batch query incidents involved numerous queries conducted by the tool but pertained to a small subset of users.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Informed by these and other FBI query incidents, the FISC assessed the FBI’s use of query terms in opinions the court issued on &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISC_Opin_18Oct18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;October 18, 2018 &lt;i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISC_Opinion_04Sep19.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;September 4, 2019 &lt;i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_FISC_Opinion_06Dec19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;December 6, 2019 &lt;i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.  In the 2018 opinion, the FISC found that the FBI’s querying procedures were not consistent with Section 702 or the Fourth Amendment in part because they did not require adequate documentation of justifications for U.S. person queries.   In response to the Court’s opinions, the FBI made system modifications necessary to meet query recordkeeping and documentation requirements and provided training on these new modifications.  The previously released &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_FISC_Opinion_06Dec19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;December 2019 FISC opinion &lt;i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt; discusses these changes.  The FBI incidents discussed in this 20&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Joint Assessment were reported to the FISC in a reporting period (December 2017 – May 2018) that preceded the 2018 and 2019 court opinions and the FBI’s implementation of these remedial actions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;ODNI has previously released a number of prior joint assessments, which may be found on &lt;a href="https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/" target="_blank"&gt;IC on the Record &lt;i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/intel-vault" target="_blank"&gt;Intel.gov&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Below is today’s release, in redacted form:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/20th%20Joint%20Assessment%204.2.2021.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;20&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Joint Assessment (dated November 2020): reporting period December 1, 2017-May 31, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/647380635549384704</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/647380635549384704</guid><pubDate>Fri, 02 Apr 2021 15:04:45 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>

ODNI, DOJ, and DHS Release Unclassified Summary of Assessment on Domestic Violent...</title><description>&lt;figure class="tmblr-full" data-orig-height="57" data-orig-width="500"&gt;&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/f9e717b98cfb156e343ab6cf11a0f87d/6337224767f292ff-f5/s540x810/3fac010305d6574e7055b80bba78070330ae07e1.png" data-orig-height="57" data-orig-width="500"/&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;b&gt;

ODNI, DOJ, and DHS Release Unclassified Summary of Assessment on Domestic Violent Extremism

&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;

March 17, 2021

&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) today released an unclassified summary of the joint comprehensive threat assessment on domestic violent extremism. The unclassified summary is attached and will be available on DNI.gov later today.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The ODNI assessment was drafted by the National Counterterrorism Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and DHS, and includes contributions from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. All agencies involved are mindful of the duty to respect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties and to act within the authorities granted to them as they seek to put together as complete an intelligence and analytic picture as is possible.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Read the report: &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment-17MAR21.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Unclassified Summary of Assessment on Domestic Violent Extremism &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2021/item/2195-odni-doj-and-dhs-release-unclassified-summary-of-assessment-on-domestic-violent-extremism" target="_blank"&gt;View original press statement on DNI.gov&lt;/a&gt; &lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;###&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/645935167866798080</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/645935167866798080</guid><pubDate>Wed, 17 Mar 2021 16:09:39 -0400</pubDate></item><item><title>ODNI Releases Intelligence Community Assessment of Foreign...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/f9e717b98cfb156e343ab6cf11a0f87d/1f6597628d0a8ba5-7b/s500x750/eb96cbfaf2c0288a8952f98cdf1d8fabb3f4817d.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;ODNI Releases Intelligence Community Assessment of Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Elections&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;March 16, 2021&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) today 
released the declassified Intelligence Community (IC) assessment of 
foreign threats to the 2020 U.S. federal elections. The document is a 
declassified version of a classified report that the IC provided to the 
President, senior Executive Branch officials, and Congressional 
leadership and intelligence oversight committees on January 7, 2021.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Foreign malign influence is an enduring challenge facing our 
country,” said Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines. “These 
efforts by U.S. adversaries seek to exacerbate divisions and undermine 
confidence in our democratic institutions. Addressing this ongoing 
challenge requires a whole-of-government approach grounded in an 
accurate understanding of the problem, which the Intelligence Community,
 through assessments such as this one, endeavors to provide.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Coordinated across the IC, the assessment addresses the intentions 
and efforts of key foreign actors to influence or interfere with the 
2020 U.S. elections and undermine public confidence in the U.S. election
 process. The assessment builds on the analysis the IC provided to the 
public and policymakers throughout the 2020 election cycle.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Additionally, pursuant to Executive Order 13848(1)(b), the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security today 
issued an unclassified summary that evaluates the impact of foreign 
influence or interference efforts on the security and integrity of U.S. 
election infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Read the report:&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2021/item/2193-odni-releases-intelligence-community-assessment-of-foreign-threats-to-the-2020-u-s-elections" target="_blank"&gt;View the original press statement via DNI.gov  &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/645844707515236352</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/645844707515236352</guid><pubDate>Tue, 16 Mar 2021 16:11:49 -0400</pubDate><category>declassified</category><category>election security</category><category>foreign threats</category><category>foreign influence</category><category>malign influence</category><category>election</category><category>2020 election</category><category>transparency</category><category>odni</category><category>ICA</category><category>NIC</category><category>National Intelligence Council</category></item><item><title>Assessing the Saudi Government’s Role in the Killing of...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/f9e717b98cfb156e343ab6cf11a0f87d/7623160820a6fa43-f4/s500x750/cd6f702fe85c9faf81fd6e3b9a761441a0b22f92.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;b&gt;Assessing the Saudi Government’s Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Declassified by Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;February 25, 2021&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Consistent with Sections 1277 and 5714 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92) and with the 
commitment made during her January 20, 2021, nomination hearing before 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of National 
Security Avril Haines today declassified an Intelligence Community 
assessment regarding the Saudi Government’s role in the killing of Jamal
 Khashoggi.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/Assessment-Saudi-Gov-Role-in-JK-Death-20210226v2.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Download the report&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/645844835441557504</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/645844835441557504</guid><pubDate>Fri, 26 Feb 2021 16:13:51 -0500</pubDate><category>Jamal Khashoggi</category><category>declassified</category><category>ODNI</category><category>Assessment</category><category>Saudi Arabia</category></item><item><title>ODNI Releases ODNI-Attorney General Procedures for Conducting...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/f9e717b98cfb156e343ab6cf11a0f87d/f357fe991de312d2-09/s500x750/716b23ca0ac7d62753fd9fb93dffc5ee8f66a464.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;ODNI Releases ODNI-Attorney General Procedures for Conducting Intelligence Activities&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;January 14, 2021&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) released new procedures approved by the Director of 
National Intelligence and the Attorney General governing the conduct of 
ODNI intelligence activities.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As required by Executive Order 12333, these procedures, commonly 
referred to as the “Attorney General (AG) Guidelines,” provide the core 
protections for ODNI’s collection and handling of information concerning
 U.S. persons in the conduct of lawful intelligence activities. ODNI’s 
AG Guidelines also prescribe the limited circumstances in which ODNI 
personnel may participate in a U.S. organization without disclosing 
their ODNI affiliation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Until the effective date of the new ODNI AG Guidelines on March 23, 
ODNI will continue to conduct intelligence activities within established
 National Counterterrorism Center or CIA AG Guidelines.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“As intelligence professionals, our first duty is to the American 
people,” said Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe. “We must
 continue to ensure that we always conduct our intelligence activities 
lawfully, appropriately integrate intelligence in support of national 
security, and protect the privacy and civil liberties of every American.
 ODNI’s AG Guidelines provide the framework for executing that mission.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The new ODNI AG Guidelines are part of a multi-year effort to update 
comparable sets of procedures across the Intelligence Community (IC). 
They ensure the IC takes a consistent approach to protecting privacy and
 civil liberties while integrating intelligence information across many 
different intelligence elements and disciplines.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Consistent with the Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the 
IC, the ODNI’s AG Guidelines are unclassified and proactively released 
in their entirety &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/ODNI%20guidelines%20as%20approved%20by%20AG%2012.23.20_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.
 In addition, a narrative document describing key provisions of the 
Guidelines, including the authorities and restrictions that govern 
ODNI’s collection, evaluation, retention and dissemination of 
information, as well as the oversight mechanisms that ODNI will use to 
ensure compliance with these protections, is available &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/ODNI%20Attorney%20General%20Procedures%20Narrative%20Summary_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/ODNI%20guidelines%20as%20approved%20by%20AG%2012.23.20_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;ODNI AG Guidelines&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/ODNI%20Attorney%20General%20Procedures%20Narrative%20Summary_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;ODNI AG Guidelines Procedure Summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/640315189500248065</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/640315189500248065</guid><pubDate>Thu, 14 Jan 2021 14:22:30 -0500</pubDate><category>declassified</category><category>fisa</category><category>ODNI</category><category>AGGuidelines</category></item><item><title>Release of the 19th Joint Assessment of Section 702...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/f9e717b98cfb156e343ab6cf11a0f87d/56a4ddfbc6a48742-a9/s500x750/6d49250a869954c305e7580b3c2328104177feae.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Release of the 19&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Joint Assessment of Section 702 Compliance&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;October 8, 2020&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today, the DNI, in consultation with the Department of Justice, is releasing in redacted form the 19&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;
 Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines 
Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence (“Joint Assessment”). The DNI is releasing this semiannual assessment proactively, in keeping with the Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the Intelligence Community.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 requires the Attorney General and the
 DNI to assess compliance with Section 702 procedures over each six 
month period and to submit such assessments to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) and relevant congressional committees. A 
joint team of experts (the Joint Oversight Team) from DOJ and ODNI 
conduct these assessments.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Joint Assessments describe the extensive measures the Government 
undertakes to ensure compliance with FISC-approved targeting and 
minimization procedures; to accurately identify, record and correct 
errors; to take responsive actions to remove any erroneously obtained 
data; and to minimize the chances that mistakes will recur. The Joint 
Assessments have found that the agencies continue to implement the 
procedures in a manner that reflects a focused and concerted effort by 
IC personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One new item contained in this 19&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Joint Assessment
 is an additional metric to assess compliance.  As explained in previous
 assessments, the Joint Oversight Team periodically evaluates how and 
what data it collects to provide for more meaningful statistics. The 
Joint Assessment has traditionally tracked the overall compliance 
incident rate; however, this statistic remains imperfect, as the 
assessment explains. Thus, the Joint Oversight Team determined that 
providing a new, additional comparison rate – NSA’s targeting compliance
 incident rate – would enhance overseers’ and the public’s understanding
 of Section 702 compliance. For consistency in evaluating long-term 
trends, this Joint Assessment also continues to provide the overall 
compliance incident rate.  Additional details about the new measurement 
are provided in the Joint Assessment.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;ODNI has previously released a number of prior joint assessments, which may be found on&lt;a href="https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/" target="_blank"&gt; IC on the Record  &lt;/a&gt;and&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/ic-on-the-record-database/advanced-search" target="_blank"&gt; Intel.gov &lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Below is today’s release, in redacted form:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/19th%20Joint%20Assessment%20for%20702%20Dec%202019%20-%20Final%20for%20release%20(002)OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;19&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Joint Assessment (dated December 2019): reporting period June 1, 2017-November 30, 2017&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/631424082448154624</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/631424082448154624</guid><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2020 12:02:10 -0400</pubDate><category>declassifeid</category><category>FISA</category><category>FISC</category><category>Joint Assessment</category><category>section 702</category></item><item><title>Release of FISA Opinion Regarding Electronic Surveillance...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/f9e717b98cfb156e343ab6cf11a0f87d/62d4ca71abf74336-48/s500x750/32cf8f249b9e194a476eae3e3b1faf12d6367bd5.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Release of FISA Opinion Regarding Electronic Surveillance Technique&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;September 23, 2020&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Department of Justice, releases a March 5, 2020, 
opinion by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) 
requires that prior to issuing an order authorizing electronic 
surveillance, the FISC must determine, among other things, that there is
 probable cause to believe (A) that the target of the collection is a 
foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and (B) that “each of the 
facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is to be 
directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or 
agent of a foreign power.”  50 U.S.C. 1805(a)(2).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the course of analyzing a novel, classified
surveillance technique, the FISC’s March 2020 opinion examined each portion of the second half of 
these required findings, interpreting FISA with respect to what 
constitutes a “facility” at which surveillance may be directed, as well 
as whether the proposed surveillance was in fact “directed” at an 
appropriate facility. The FISC further addressed whether FISA requires the FISC to make a 
probable cause finding regarding the targeted facilities in their 
totality, or whether the FISC instead should make probable cause 
findings for “each” facility individually. The FISC appointed both legal
 and technical amici curiae to assist in its analysis of the complex 
surveillance technique.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The FISC ultimately determined that the proposed surveillance 
technique was consistent with the statutory terms and that there was 
probable cause to assess that the targets used each of the specified 
facilities. The FISC further ordered the Government to report on whether
 the technique resulted in the acquisition of non-target communications.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;While redactions have been made to protect the classified and 
sensitive surveillance method discussed in this opinion, ODNI is making 
this opinion publicly available to the greatest extent practicable, as 
required by 50 U.S.C. § 1872.
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/FISC%20Opin%20re%20Technical%20Facilities%20Use%209.23.20%20release_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FISC’s March 2020 Opinion &lt;/a&gt;(released pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1872)&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/630073119327109120</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/630073119327109120</guid><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2020 14:09:11 -0400</pubDate><category>declassified</category><category>fisa</category><category>fisc</category><category>surveillance</category><category>fisc opinion</category></item><item><title>Release of Court Opinion Related to the Temporary Retention,...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/f9e717b98cfb156e343ab6cf11a0f87d/82466a109afa60e3-3e/s500x750/f6d03a0281c18ff22642d9adaae29207506d2c4e.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;b&gt;Release of Court Opinion Related to the Temporary Retention, Use, and Disclosure of Unlawful FISA Collection&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;September 11, 2020&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today, the ODNI, in consultation with the Department of Justice, 
releases a June 25, 2020, opinion by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) evaluating and approving limited circumstances
 under which the Government may temporarily retain, use, or disclose 
information that was unlawfully acquired pursuant to a FISC order. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On December 9, 2019, the Government advised the FISC that it was 
sequestering collection associated with Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) applications targeting Carter W. Page (Page) 
based upon its determination that at least the third and fourth FISA 
applications targeting Page lacked sufficient predication to establish 
probable cause that Page was acting as an agent of a foreign power. This
 action was taken following a Department of Justice &lt;a href="https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/120919-examination.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Office of Inspector General (OIG) review &lt;i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt; that identified material errors and omissions with respect to applications concerning Mr. Page.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;While the Government strictly limited access to the Page FISA 
collection, the Government sought to temporarily retain this collection 
for the sole purposes of reviewing and remediating the issues revealed 
by the OIG report, as well as for any related investigations or 
litigation regarding the Government’s conduct. On January 7, 2020, &lt;a href="https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/FISC%20Declassifed%20Order%2016-1182%2017-52%2017-375%2017-679%20%20200123.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;the FISC ordered the Government &lt;i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;
 to explain why any retention, use, or disclosure of information 
collected under the Page FISA applications was necessary and lawful.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Specifically, 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(2) and 1827(a)(2) criminalizes the 
intentional use and disclosure of information acquired by unauthorized 
electronic surveillance or physical search that was conducted under the 
color of a FISA authorization. In prior opinions, however, the FISC 
recognized a limited exception to the language of 50 U.S.C. § 
1809(a)(2), for “actions that are necessary to mitigate or 
prevent the very harms at which [this section] is addressed,” such as 
instances where use or disclosure may be “&lt;i&gt;necessary&lt;/i&gt; to avoid similar 
instances of overcollections.” ODNI previously reviewed and released to 
the public these earlier FISC decisions, which are available &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/EFF-FOIA-Jan-31-Doc-10.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;here &lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/EFF-FOIA-Jan-31-Doc-11.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;here &lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In its June 25, 2020, opinion, the FISC set parameters for the 
temporary retention, use, and disclosure of information acquired 
pursuant to the Page FISA applications with respect to:  (1) ongoing 
Freedom of Information Act litigation with third-parties, (2) ongoing 
and potential civil litigation initiated by Mr. Page, (3) a review of 
FBI personnel’s conduct in the Page investigation, (4) Department of 
Justice Office of Inspector General monitoring of implementation of 
recommendations from its report, and (5) review of the conduct of 
government personnel in the Page investigation and the broader 
“Crossfire Hurricane” investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 
Presidential election. &lt;b&gt;The Government did not seek nor did the 
FISC authorize the retention, use, or disclosure of the relevant FISA 
information for intelligence purposes.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The FISC’s June 25, 2020 opinion is available at the link below and also in full-text searchable format &lt;a href="https://intelligence.gov/ic-on-the-record-database/advanced-search" target="_blank"&gt;on Intelligence.gov&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/June_2020_FISC_Opinion.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;June 2020 FISC Opinion&lt;/a&gt; (released pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1872)&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/628977689901056000</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/628977689901056000</guid><pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2020 11:57:48 -0400</pubDate><category>declassified</category><category>FISA</category><category>FISC</category><category>Section 702</category><category>DOJ</category><category>FBI</category><category>Carter Page</category></item><item><title>Release of Documents Related to the 2019 FISA Section 702...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/f9e717b98cfb156e343ab6cf11a0f87d/82fd395c4c0dce67-da/s500x750/4b4e87581780a4f988ebf9fe5b98a8f9f6b99719.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;b&gt;Release of Documents Related to the 2019 FISA Section 702 Certifications&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;September 4, 2020&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today the ODNI, in consultation with the Department of Justice,
releases documents related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court’s (FISC) approval of the 2019 Certifications under Section 702 the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On December 6, 2019, the FISC issued a classified Memorandum Opinion
and Order approving the 2019 Certifications and the associated
targeting, minimization, and querying procedures (linked below). In the
Memorandum Opinion, the Court examined the proposed procedures and found
that they satisfy the requirements of FISA and the Fourth Amendment.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the Court examined the implementation of and compliance
with prior Section 702 procedures, including the FBI’s progress in
implementing the recordkeeping and documentation requirements contained
within FBI’s querying procedures. The Court concluded that the
procedures, as implemented, also comport with statutory and Fourth
Amendment requirements.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As it pertained to FBI’s querying procedures, the Court revisited its analysis of the &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/ic-on-the-record-database/results/951-release-of-documents-related-to-the-2018-fisa-section-702-certifications" target="_blank"&gt;2018 Section 702 certifications &lt;/a&gt; in its &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISC_Opinion_04Sep19.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;September 2019 Opinion &lt;/a&gt;,
finding that the FBI continued to follow its previously described
implementation schedule to complete training and systems modifications
necessary to meet query recordkeeping and documentation requirements.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In addition to releasing the FISC opinion, ODNI is releasing the
targeting, minimization, and querying procedures related to the 2019
Certifications. Links to these documents are provided below.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The documents are also posted in full-text searchable format on Intel.gov.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_FISC_Opinion_06Dec19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FISC’s December 2019 Opinion&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;2019 Targeting Procedures (released pursuant to the IC’s Principles of Transparency):&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_FBI_Targeting_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FBI’s 2019 § 702 Targeting Procedures dated September 17, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_FBI_Targeting_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_NSA_Targeting_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NSA’s 2019 § 702 Targeting Procedures dated September 17, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;2019 Minimization and Querying Procedures (released pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e)).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_CIA_Minimization_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;CIA’s 2019 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated September 17, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_FBI_Minimization_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FBI’s 2019 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated September 17, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_NCTC_Minimization_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NCTC’s 2019 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated September 17, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_NSA_Minimization_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NSA’s 2019 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated September 17, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_CIA_Querying_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;CIA’s 2019 § 702 Querying Procedures dated September 17, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_FBI_Querying_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FBI’s 2019 § 702 Querying Procedures dated September 17, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_NCTC_Querying_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NCTC’s 2019 § 702 Querying Procedures dated September 17, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2019_702_Cert_NSA_Querying_17Sep19_OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NSA’s 2019 § 702 Querying Procedures dated September 17, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;b&gt;Background on Section 702: &lt;/b&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Section 702 was enacted as part of the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) and most recently reauthorized by the
FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017. Section 702 permits the
Attorney General and the DNI to jointly authorize, through
certifications, the targeting of (i) non-U.S. persons (ii) who are
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States (iii) to
acquire foreign intelligence information. These certifications are
accompanied by targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and
querying procedures that are each designed to ensure that the
Government’s collection is appropriately targeted against non-United
States persons located overseas who may possess or are likely to
communicate foreign intelligence information and that any such
collection is appropriately handled in a manner that protects privacy
and civil liberties.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Under Section 702, the FISC reviews the certifications and
accompanying documents to ensure that they meet all the requirements of
Section 702 and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s
review is not limited to the procedures as written, but also includes an
examination of how the procedures have been and will be implemented.
Accordingly, as part of its review, the FISC considers the compliance
incidents reported to it by the Government through notices and reports.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;For additional background information, please refer to the &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2020_ASTR_for_CY2019_FINAL.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;2020 Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities for CY2019 &lt;/a&gt; posted on Intel.gov and IC on the Record.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/628356110309572608</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/628356110309572608</guid><pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2020 15:18:03 -0400</pubDate><category>declassified</category><category>FISA</category><category>Section 702</category><category>surveillance</category><category>FISC</category></item><item><title>Intelligence Community Releases Artificial Intelligence...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/51385a4cb0f174ea7d137e52f33d0ab8/c439ab7dcb24a0ce-0e/s500x750/3ee1965d95c3741864ee0df2b33f7e9581e49481.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Intelligence Community Releases Artificial Intelligence Principles and Framework&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;Narrowing the gap between data collection and decision making is a 
top priority for the Intelligence Community, but the pace at which data 
is generated is increasing exponentially—and the IC workforce available 
to analyze the data is not. Artificial intelligence provides powerful 
tools to execute this mission, but also brings new challenges.That makes
 it even more important that the IC to implement AI in a manner that is 
both ethical and consistent with our values.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Which is to say that AI is about much more than technology. The IC 
must ensure that technological changes do not change our commitment to 
protecting privacy and civil liberties in the course of our work.That’s 
why our data scientists, privacy and civil liberties officers and other 
key stakeholders worked together to develop the &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/principles-of-artificial-intelligence-ethics-for-the-intelligence-community" target="_blank"&gt;Principles of AI Ethics for the Intelligence Community&lt;/a&gt; as well as &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/artificial-intelligence-ethics-framework-for-the-intelligence-community" target="_blank"&gt;a framework to ensure that these principles are incorporated&lt;/a&gt; into our design and use of this technology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This framework is a living document, and we’re eager for your 
feedback on how we can continue to expand and refine it to keep pace 
with this rapidly evolving technology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;View the &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/principles-of-artificial-intelligence-ethics-for-the-intelligence-community" target="_blank"&gt;AI Principles of Ethics for the IC&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;View the &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/artificial-intelligence-ethics-framework-for-the-intelligence-community" target="_blank"&gt;AI Ethics Framework for the IC&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Read the press release at &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2134-intelligence-community-releases-artificial-intelligence-principles-and-framework" target="_blank"&gt;DNI.gov&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/625167414559129600</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/625167414559129600</guid><pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2020 10:35:06 -0400</pubDate><category>oversight</category><category>ethics</category><category>artificial intelligence</category><category>ai</category><category>intelligence community</category><category>Benjamin Huebner</category><category>Deal</category><category>civil liberties</category><category>privacy</category><category>human rights</category><category>ai ethics</category><category>dean souleles</category><category>ODNI</category></item><item><title>ODNI Releases Annual Intelligence Community Transparency Report</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;April 30, 2020&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Today, consistent with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), as amended (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)),
and the Intelligence Community’s (IC) &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ppd-28/FINAL%20Transparency_poster%20v1.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Principles
of Intelligence Transparency&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, we are releasing our &lt;b&gt;seventh&lt;/b&gt; annual &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2020_ASTR_for_CY2019_FINAL.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Statistical
Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt; &lt;/i&gt;presenting
statistics on how often the government uses certain national security
authorities.  &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Providing these statistics allows for an additional
way to track the use of FISA authorities, National Security Letters (NSLs), and
the dissemination of information within the government when required. The
statistics also add further context regarding the IC’s rigorous and
multi-layered oversight framework that safeguards the privacy of United States
persons’ information and non-U.S. persons’ information acquired pursuant to
these national security authorities. This report goes beyond the government’s
statutory duty of releasing statistics by further providing the public with
detailed explanations as to how the IC uses its national security authorities. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;“While secrecy is necessary for many aspects of
intelligence, it is our obligation to provide the public with appropriate and
effective transparency to allow individuals to make their own judgments on how
the Intelligence Community uses the authorities that have been granted by the
American people,” said Ben Huebner, Chief, ODNI Civil Liberties, Privacy, and
Transparency Office. “We are therefore pleased to publish our seventh annual
statistical transparency report. More than a list of figures, this report
provides explanations and context regarding how the Intelligence Community uses
key authorities. As with past reports, the information contained in today’s
report will allow the public to continue a fact-based discussion on how we
achieve both national security and the protection of our privacy and our
liberty.” &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Additional
public information on national security authorities is available on the ODNI
website, &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/" target="_blank"&gt;www.dni.gov&lt;/a&gt;, the IC’s public
website, &lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/" target="_blank"&gt;www.intel.gov&lt;/a&gt;, and ODNI’s
public Tumblr site, &lt;i&gt;IC on the Record&lt;/i&gt; at &lt;a href="https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/" target="_blank"&gt;IContheRecord.tumblr.com&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2020_ASTR_for_CY2019_FINAL.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Statistical
Transparency Report Regarding National Security Authorities Calendar Year 2019&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="tmblr-full" data-orig-height="1010" data-orig-width="782"&gt;&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/576dba11eea540aecc14a9635ecba54d/eae7edd395464c40-fb/s540x810/5c19166c4c3744a7f27d267255b74236c7bcc012.png" data-orig-height="1010" data-orig-width="782"/&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/616837775654846464</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/616837775654846464</guid><pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2020 11:59:04 -0400</pubDate><category>declassified</category><category>ASTR</category><category>transparency</category><category>fisa</category></item><item><title>IC Elements’
Procedures on Requests for U.S. Person Identities...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/51385a4cb0f174ea7d137e52f33d0ab8/83ae76dfa7b7a8fd-00/s500x750/d5b4183a939402c84ff11bfb0fddea9c7edc4ef4.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;IC Elements’
Procedures on Requests for U.S. Person Identities in Disseminated Intelligence
Reports&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;April 30, 2020&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today, we are releasing individual Intelligence Community element’s
procedures (or summary of such procedures) for implementing &lt;a href="https://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dni.gov%2Ffiles%2Fdocuments%2FICPG%2FICPG-107.1.pdf&amp;t=ODIyZjE5NzMyZGY0N2YxZTgyYWJhYjBjZGQxYzA1NDgyZTM3NzgwZSxmV3I0YTBZZw%3D%3D&amp;b=t%3ACeDO6NTe6pPkB8DydjGePw&amp;p=https%3A%2F%2Ficontherecord.tumblr.com%2Fpost%2F169786873813%2Fdni-coats-establishes-new-intelligence-community&amp;m=0" target="_blank"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Intelligence
Community Policy Guidance 107.1&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;, “Requests for Identities of US
Persons in Disseminated Intelligence Reports&lt;/i&gt;.” Such requests are commonly
referred to as “unmasking.” &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;ICPG 107.1 directs each IC element to develop and maintain procedure to
respond to requests for unmasking. After the elements developed their
respective procedures, they began implementing their procedures in January
2019. These procedures are provided below.

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Additionally, ICPG 107.1 requires the IC elements to annually report, to the
Director of National Intelligence and to Congress, the number of unmasking
requests each element received as well as the number of requests it approved or
denied. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;ICPG 107.1 also requires the DNI to publicly report the total number of
unmasking request for the IC in the annual &lt;i&gt;Statistical Transparency Report
Regarding Use of National Security Authorities&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The unmasking request numbers for calendar year 2019 will be reported in the
IC’s statistical transparency report for calendar year 2019, which will be
published on April 30, 2020 at DNI.gov, as well as posted here.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure data-orig-width="656" data-orig-height="18" class="tmblr-full"&gt;&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/6522766f5db44e62a1a35ed2653c25eb/83ae76dfa7b7a8fd-12/s540x810/69d690912afc7d93cef6cffce51a2b48f063c053.png" alt="image" data-orig-width="656" data-orig-height="18"/&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;IC Element ICPG 107.1 Procedures&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/AirForce_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_070919OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;U.S. Airforce ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/Army_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_061219OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Department of the Army
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines

&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/CIA_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_ProceduresOCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;CIA
ICPG 107.1 Unclassified Summary of Unmasking Guidelines&lt;/a&gt;

&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/DEA_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_032619OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Drug Enforcement Administration
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines

&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/DHS_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_022420OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Department of Homeland Security
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines&lt;/a&gt;

&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/DIA-ICPG_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_ProceduresOCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Defense Intelligence Agency
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines

&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/DOE_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_012919OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Department of Energy
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines

&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/Marines_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_073019OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;U.S. Marine Corps
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines

&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/Navy_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_090919OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Department of the Navy
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines

&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/NGA_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_061219OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines

&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/NRO_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_061219OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;National Reconnaissance Agency
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines

&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/NSA_ICPG_107_1_procedures_081219OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;National Security Agency
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines&lt;/a&gt;

&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/ODNI_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_01919OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Office of the Director of National Intelligence
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines&lt;/a&gt;

&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/State_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_021519OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Department of State
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines

&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/Treasury_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_022219OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Department of Treasury
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines

&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/oversight/USCG_ICPG_107_1_Unmasking_Procedures_01172019OCR.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;U.S. Coast Guard
ICPG 107.1 Unmasking Guidelines &lt;br/&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;figure data-orig-width="656" data-orig-height="18" class="tmblr-full"&gt;&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/6522766f5db44e62a1a35ed2653c25eb/83ae76dfa7b7a8fd-12/s540x810/69d690912afc7d93cef6cffce51a2b48f063c053.png" alt="image" data-orig-width="656" data-orig-height="18"/&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;

&lt;b&gt;NOTE: &lt;/b&gt;FBI ICPG 107.1 unmasking guidelines have been implemented and the procedures will be published when they become available for public release.&lt;/i&gt;

&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/616837375018041344</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/616837375018041344</guid><pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2020 11:52:41 -0400</pubDate><category>declassified</category><category>unmasking</category><category>u.s. persons</category><category>oversight</category></item><item><title>Updated Guide to Posted Documents Regarding
Use of National...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/831965a85c8775492d4586702ffa6346/99fafea79740f71f-92/s500x750/e7985b209f338d5ccf013e401be0343bf51553f8.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Updated Guide to Posted Documents Regarding
Use of National Security Authorities&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;January 7, 2020&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On September 19, 2017, we posted a text guide with links to certain officially released documents related to the use by
the Intelligence Community of national security authorities. Today, we
have once again updated that Guide to include links to additional officially
released documents: &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/ic-on-the-record/guide-to-posted-documents" target="_blank"&gt;&lt;b&gt;View Updated Guide to Posted
Documents&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These
documents have been published to meet legal requirements, as well as to carry
out the &lt;i&gt;&lt;a href="https://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dni.gov%2Findex.php%2Fic-legal-reference-book%2Fthe-principles-of-intelligence-transparency-for-the-ic&amp;t=YjBkNDM5ZjBlMGQwMjU2MTIyNWU1NTkyMjcwZDc0YjVmNWQzZjYxOCxTaUlzTUtsMg%3D%3D&amp;b=t%3ACeDO6NTe6pPkB8DydjGePw&amp;p=http%3A%2F%2Ficontherecord.tumblr.com%2Fpost%2F168475694583%2Fupdated-guide-to-posted-documents-regarding-use&amp;m=0" target="_blank"&gt;Principles of Intelligence
Transparency for the IC&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;There are
many more officially released documents available for public review than those
captured in this new guide. In addition to this Updated Guide, the IC recently
launched a new web portal, &lt;a href="https://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.intelligence.gov&amp;t=ZDQ5OTI2ODg2NTg2Mzc2OTExYzBhMzY2MWExOGY2NzUxNDY2OWUxYSxkeDBtaXBYTg%3D%3D&amp;b=t%3ACeDO6NTe6pPkB8DydjGePw&amp;p=https%3A%2F%2Ficontherecord.tumblr.com%2Fpost%2F179176931478%2Fupdated-guide-to-posted-documents-regarding-use-of&amp;m=0" target="_blank"&gt;www.intelligence.gov&lt;/a&gt;, devoted
to transparency, which features a section called the &lt;i&gt;The&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;i&gt;Intel Vault&lt;/i&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href="https://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.intel.gov%2Fintel-vault&amp;t=ZTJhODMzMmQxY2VlOGQwN2YwMTczMTFmNzAyNzFiOGY4ZDk4NmU0MixTaUlzTUtsMg%3D%3D&amp;b=t%3ACeDO6NTe6pPkB8DydjGePw&amp;p=http%3A%2F%2Ficontherecord.tumblr.com%2Fpost%2F168475694583%2Fupdated-guide-to-posted-documents-regarding-use&amp;m=0" target="_blank"&gt;Intel Vault’s&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="https://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.intel.gov%2Fic-on-the-record-database&amp;t=MDhiMGE5NmYyZDVlNDlkNjg0YWE1OGMyZWQ4NWIzY2I1YTdkOGUyYixkeDBtaXBYTg%3D%3D&amp;b=t%3ACeDO6NTe6pPkB8DydjGePw&amp;p=https%3A%2F%2Ficontherecord.tumblr.com%2Fpost%2F179176931478%2Fupdated-guide-to-posted-documents-regarding-use-of&amp;m=0" target="_blank"&gt;IC on the Record Database&lt;/a&gt;
enables users to conduct full-text searches of the Section 702 documents posted
on IC on the Record. Newly released documents will be regularly added to this
database.&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/190122054298</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/190122054298</guid><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jan 2020 10:50:33 -0500</pubDate><category>factsheet</category><category>FISA</category><category>surveillance</category><category>Section 702</category><category>Section 215</category><category>transparency</category></item><item><title>Release of Documents Related to the 2018 FISA Section 702...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/99e2b65f0d00d731e09f4c255ab22bcc/tumblr_pz0g8p10Hj1serkyyo1_500.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Release of Documents Related to the 2018 FISA Section 702 Certifications&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;October 8, 2019&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Today the ODNI, in consultation with the Department of Justice, is releasing documents, in redacted form, related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approval of the 2018 Certifications under Section 702 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  Initially, the FISC approved most aspects of the 2018 Certifications but found that certain parts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) procedures concerning the querying of United States persons were not sufficient. The Government appealed this decision to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISC-R), which affirmed the FISC’s decision in part.  The Government subsequently submitted amended FBI querying procedures to address the issues, and the FISC found that the amended procedures were sufficient.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In addition to releasing the FISC and FISC-R opinions and to provide greater transparency to the public, we are also releasing all the targeting, minimization, and querying procedures related to the 2018 Certifications.  Links to these documents, along with descriptions on the court decisions and background information on Section 702, are provided below.  The documents are also posted in full-text searchable format on &lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/ic-on-the-record-database" target="_blank"&gt;Intel.gov&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;!-- more --&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;The 2018 Certifications and the FISC’s April Extension Order&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In March 2018, the Government had submitted the 2018 Certifications from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. The 2018 Certifications, which contained required targeting, minimization, and querying procedures, sought to renew the expiring 2016 Certifications.  In April 2018, the FISC issued an order finding that the 2018 Certifications and accompanying procedures “likely present[ed] one or more novel or significant interpretations of law, the consideration of which would benefit from amicus participation.”  The FISC found “good cause” to extend the time for its consideration of the 2018 Certifications to provide for meaningful amicus curiae participation in the matter.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISC_Order_05Apr18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FISC’s April 5, 2018 Order&lt;/a&gt; (released pursuant to&lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ic-legal-reference-book/the-principles-of-intelligence-transparency-for-the-ic" target="_blank"&gt; the IC’s Principles of Transparency)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Background on the 2016 Certifications:&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;em&gt;The 2016 certifications were submitted to the FISC in September 2016. The FISC twice extended its time to consider the 2016 certifications and ultimately approved them on April 26, 2017 with an expiration date of April 26, 2018 (see &lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2016_Cert_FISC_Memo_Opin_Order_Apr_2017.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FISC’s April 26, 2017 Memorandum and Opinion&lt;/a&gt; posted on May 10, 2017 on IC on the Record). Because review of the 2016 certifications were extended through 2017 and because the 2016 certification authority did not expire until April 2018, the Government did not submit certifications in 2017.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;hr&gt;&lt;h2&gt;The FISC’s October 2018 Opinion&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;After receiving briefings and holding hearings involving the Government and Court-appointed amici curiae, the FISC issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on October 18, 2018, (hereafter the FISC’s October 2018 Opinion), approving most aspects of the 2018 Certifications and accompanying targeting, minimization, and querying procedures. This opinion is linked below.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The FISC found that “the minimization procedures and querying procedures to be implemented by the FBI are consistent with the requirements of Section 702(e) and Section 702(f)(1)(A)-(B) respectively and of the Fourth Amendment, except insofar as they [were] inconsistent” with those authorities in two aspects.   First, the FISC found that the FBI’s retention of all query terms without differentiating which terms concern U.S. persons did not meet the requirements of Section 702(f)(1)(B) of FISA, a provision enacted as part of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 requiring the Government to adopt querying procedures that, among other things, “include a technical procedure whereby a record is kept of each United States person query term used for a query.”  The FISC concluded that Section 702(f)(1)(B) requires that the FBI’s query records indicate which terms concern U.S. persons.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The FISC also concluded that the FBI’s querying and minimization procedures, as implemented, were inconsistent with Section 702 and the Fourth Amendment, in light of certain identified compliance incidents involving queries of Section 702 information.  These incidents involved instances in which personnel either misapplied or misunderstood the query standard, such that the queries were not reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime.  Some of these instances involved queries concerning large numbers of individuals.  While stating that the Government had taken “constructive steps” to address the identified issues, the FISC held that these steps did not fully address the statutory and Fourth Amendment concerns raised by the compliance incidents.  The FISC suggested, however, that these statutory and Fourth Amendment concerns would be remedied if the Government adopted a proposal made by amici to document, in writing, the basis for the FBI’s belief that a particular query of Section 702 data using a U.S. person query term is reasonably likely to return foreign-intelligence information or evidence of crime before FBI personnel examined the content of Section 702 information returned by such queries. The 2018 Querying Procedures submitted by the other agencies, which were approved by the FISC as noted above, include this same documentation requirement.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the FISC considered the scope of certain new restrictions regarding “abouts” communications that were enacted in the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017.  “Abouts” collection is the acquisition of communications that contain a reference to, but are not to or from, a Section 702 target.  As the NSA explained in April 2017 (see &lt;a href="https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/Article/1618699/nsa-stops-certain-section-702-upstream-activities/" target="_blank"&gt;NSA’s April 28, 2017 Statement&lt;/a&gt;), the NSA stopped acquiring any upstream internet communications that are solely “about” a foreign intelligence target and, instead, limited its Section 702 collection  to only those communications that are directly “to” or “from” a foreign intelligence target.  NSA’s 2018 Targeting Procedures contained the same limitation. Although the Government did not seek to resume “abouts” collection, the FISC, with assistance from amici, reviewed whether the “abouts” restrictions applied to any other types of Section 702 acquisitions currently being conducted.  While the FISC held that the “abouts” restrictions apply across Section 702 acquisitions, it found that current Section 702 acquisitions did not implicate the “abouts” restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol start="2"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISC_Opin_18Oct18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FISC’s October 2018 Opinion&lt;/a&gt; (released pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1872)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Appeal and FISC-R July 2019 Opinion&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Government appealed the FISC’s deficiency finding related to the FBI’s procedures to the FISC-R which, after briefings and oral arguments by the Government and amici, issued a per curiam opinion on July 12, 2019, affirming in part the FISC’s decision (hereafter FISC-R’s July 2019 Opinion).  This opinion is hyperlinked below.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Like the FISC, the FISC-R concluded that “Section702(f)(1)(B) is best interpreted as requiring some kind of technical procedure that requires agency personnel to memorialize, to the extent reasonably feasible, whether a query term is a United States person query term.”  Because the FISC-R’s conclusion regarding Section 702(f)(1)(B) required the Government to amend the FBI’s querying procedures, it declined to reach the issue of whether the FBI’s querying and minimization procedures complied with the requirements of FISA and the Fourth Amendment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol start="3"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISCR_Opinion_12Jul19.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FISC-R July 2019 Opinion&lt;/a&gt; (released pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1872)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;h2&gt;FBI’s Amended Querying Procedures&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In response, the Government submitted, on August 12, 2019, amended FBI querying procedures (linked below) addressing the concerns identified in both the FISC and FISC-R opinions.  The FBI’s amended querying procedures require that:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;the FBI’s query records differentiate between U.S. person queries and all other queries;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;the FBI record a written justification stating why a U.S. person query was reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime prior to reviewing the contents returned by such a query; and&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;the FBI make available records generated under these requirements to enable oversight by the Department of Justice and ODNI.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;To implement the new provisions, the FBI assesses that it will complete the necessary modifications to two of its three applicable systems and provide training on the new requirements by approximately mid-December 2019.  The FBI is considering whether or not to modify the third system or to stop using that system to hold unminimized Section 702 collection.  In the interim, the FBI will require that the necessary query records be created outside that system.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;FISC’s Amended September 2019 Opinion&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On September 4, 2019, the FISC approved the FBI’s amended querying procedures, explaining that the revisions remedy the deficiencies contained in the earlier procedures. Thus, the FISC held that the FBI’s minimization and querying procedures were consistent with the requirements of Section 702 and the Fourth Amendment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol start="4"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISC_Opinion_04Sep19.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FISC’s September 2019 Opinion&lt;/a&gt; (released pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1872)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;h2&gt;2018 Section 702 Certifications Procedures&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;2018 Targeting Procedures (released pursuant to the IC’s Principles of Transparency):&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol start="5"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FBI_Targeting_27Mar18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FBI’s 2018 § 702 Targeting Procedures dated March 27, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_NSA_Targeting_27Mar18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NSA’s 2018 § 702 Targeting Procedures dated March 27, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;2018 Minimization and Querying Procedures (released pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e)):&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol start="7"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_CIA_Minimization_27Mar18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;CIA’s 2018 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated March 27, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FBI_Minimization_27Mar18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FBI’s 2018 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated March 27, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_NCTC_Minimization_27Mar18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NCTC’s 2018 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated March 27, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_NSA_Minimization_27Mar18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NSA’s 2018 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated March 27, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_ALL_Querying_27Mar18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Consolidated 2018 § 702 Querying Procedures dated March 27, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_CIA_Minimization_18Sep18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;CIA’s Amended 2018 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated September 16, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018%20Cert%20-%20FBI%20-%20Minimization%20-%2018%20Sep%2018.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FBI’s Amended 2018 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated September 16, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_NCTC_Minimization_18Sep18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NCTC’s Amended 2018 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated September 16, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_NSA_Minimization_18Sep18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NSA’s Amended 2018 § 702 Minimization Procedures dated September 16, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_CIA_Querying_18Sep18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;CIA’s 2018 § 702 Querying Procedures dated September 16, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FBI_Querying_18Sep18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FBI’s 2018 § 702 Querying Procedures dated September 16, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_NCTC_Querying_18Sep18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NCTC’s 2018 § 702 Querying Procedures dated September 16, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_NSA_Querying_18Sep18.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;NSA’s 2018 § 702 Querying Procedures dated September 16, 2018&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FBI_Querying_Amended_12Aug19.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;FBI’s Amended 2018 § 702 Querying Procedures dated August 12, 2019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Background on Section 702:&lt;/strong&gt; Section 702 was enacted as part of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) and most recently reauthorized by the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017.  Section 702 permits the Attorney General and the DNI to jointly authorize, through certifications, the targeting of (i) non-U.S. persons (ii) who are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States (iii) to acquire foreign intelligence information.  These certifications are accompanied by targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and querying procedures that are each designed to ensure that the Government’s collection is appropriately targeted against non-United States persons located overseas who may possess or are likely to communicate foreign intelligence information and that any such collection is appropriately handled in a manner that protects privacy and civil liberties.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Under Section 702, the FISC reviews the certifications and accompanying documents to ensure that they meet all the requirements of Section 702 and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  The Court’s review is not limited to the procedures as written, but also includes an examination of how the procedures have been and will be implemented.  Accordingly, as part of its review, the FISC considers the compliance incidents reported to it by the Government through notices and reports.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;For additional background information, please refer to the 2019 &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2019_ASTR_for_CY2018.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities for CY2018&lt;/a&gt; posted on ODNI’s website &lt;a href="https://icontherecord.tumblr.com" target="_blank"&gt;IC on the Record&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;hr&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/188217887058</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/188217887058</guid><pubDate>Tue, 08 Oct 2019 14:29:10 -0400</pubDate><category>FISC</category><category>FISA</category><category>Section 702</category><category>702</category><category>declassified</category><category>FIB</category><category>NSA</category><category>DOJ</category><category>ODNI</category><category>CIA</category><category>minimization</category><category>Targeting Proceedures</category><category>Minimization Proceedures</category><category>querying</category><category>FISC-R</category></item><item><title>NSA Office of the Inspector General Releases Semi-Annual
Report...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/0005e152fd7da2cca955cbad98836e59/tumblr_puurk2OM331serkyyo2_r1_500.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; Oversight&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; &lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/3949780676a409b9a3de31f6ff2bd4d8/tumblr_puurk2OM331serkyyo1_r1_500.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; Cover -- NSA Semi-Annual Report to Congress&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; &lt;h2&gt;NSA Office of the Inspector General Releases Semi-Annual
Report to Congress&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;July 18, 2019&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The National Security Agency/Central Security Service
Office of the Inspector General has released an unclassified version of its
latest &lt;a href="https://oig.nsa.gov/Portals/71/Reports/SAR/OCT-MAR_2019%20UNCLASSIFIED%20OIG%20SAR.pdf?ver=2019-07-08-092742-750" target="_blank"&gt;Semi-Annual Report to Congress&lt;/a&gt; on its public website, &lt;a href="https://oig.nsa.gov" target="_blank"&gt;OIG.NSA.GOV.&lt;/a&gt; This report details NSA OIG’s activities from October 1, 2018-March 31, 2019.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Thirteen reports and oversight memoranda were issued by
the NSA OIG during this period, including 198 recommendations to assist the
Agency in addressing the findings and deficiencies identified. NSA’s management
agreed with all OIG recommendations made during this period. Prior to the
public release of the report, the Director of the NSA and Congress received the
classified version of the SAR in accordance with the Inspector General Act of
1978, as amended.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The NSA OIG conducts independent oversight that promotes
Agency respect for Constitutional rights, adherence to laws, rules, and
regulations, and the wise use of public resources. Through investigations and
reviews, the OIG detects and deters waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct, while
promoting the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of Agency operations. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Consistent with the &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/how-we-work/transparency" target="_blank"&gt;Principles for Intelligence
Transparency&lt;/a&gt;, NSA OIG makes an unclassified version of its reports available to
the public to increase understanding regarding the authorities and oversight
that govern NSA’s programs.&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/186381453363</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/186381453363</guid><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jul 2019 15:36:06 -0400</pubDate><category>oversight</category><category>compliance</category><category>inspector general</category><category>NSA</category></item><item><title>Updated Guide to
Posted Documents Regarding Use of National...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/cdc153cec4809a176ef30a4e53c314d7/tumblr_ptm55vVQvj1serkyyo1_500.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;b&gt;Updated Guide to
Posted Documents Regarding Use of National Security Authorities&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;June 24, 2019&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On September 19, 2017, we posted a guide with links to certain officially
released documents related to the use by the Intelligence Community (IC) of
national security authorities. Today, we have once again updated that Guide to
include links to additional officially released documents: &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/Guide_to_Posted_Documents_June__19_2019.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;View Updated Guide to Posted Documents&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These documents have been published to meet legal requirements, as well as
to carry out the &lt;i&gt;&lt;a href="https://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dni.gov%2Findex.php%2Fic-legal-reference-book%2Fthe-principles-of-intelligence-transparency-for-the-ic&amp;t=YjBkNDM5ZjBlMGQwMjU2MTIyNWU1NTkyMjcwZDc0YjVmNWQzZjYxOCxTaUlzTUtsMg%3D%3D&amp;b=t%3ACeDO6NTe6pPkB8DydjGePw&amp;p=http%3A%2F%2Ficontherecord.tumblr.com%2Fpost%2F168475694583%2Fupdated-guide-to-posted-documents-regarding-use&amp;m=0" target="_blank"&gt;Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the IC&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;There are many more officially released documents available for public
review than those captured in this new guide. In addition to this Updated
Guide, the IC recently launched a new web portal, &lt;a href="https://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.intelligence.gov&amp;t=ZDQ5OTI2ODg2NTg2Mzc2OTExYzBhMzY2MWExOGY2NzUxNDY2OWUxYSxkeDBtaXBYTg%3D%3D&amp;b=t%3ACeDO6NTe6pPkB8DydjGePw&amp;p=https%3A%2F%2Ficontherecord.tumblr.com%2Fpost%2F179176931478%2Fupdated-guide-to-posted-documents-regarding-use-of&amp;m=0" target="_blank"&gt;www.intelligence.gov&lt;/a&gt;, devoted to
transparency, which features a section called the &lt;i&gt;The&lt;/i&gt; &lt;i&gt;Intel Vault&lt;/i&gt;.
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href="https://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.intel.gov%2Fintel-vault&amp;t=ZTJhODMzMmQxY2VlOGQwN2YwMTczMTFmNzAyNzFiOGY4ZDk4NmU0MixTaUlzTUtsMg%3D%3D&amp;b=t%3ACeDO6NTe6pPkB8DydjGePw&amp;p=http%3A%2F%2Ficontherecord.tumblr.com%2Fpost%2F168475694583%2Fupdated-guide-to-posted-documents-regarding-use&amp;m=0" target="_blank"&gt;Intel Vault’s&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="https://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.intel.gov%2Fic-on-the-record-database&amp;t=MDhiMGE5NmYyZDVlNDlkNjg0YWE1OGMyZWQ4NWIzY2I1YTdkOGUyYixkeDBtaXBYTg%3D%3D&amp;b=t%3ACeDO6NTe6pPkB8DydjGePw&amp;p=https%3A%2F%2Ficontherecord.tumblr.com%2Fpost%2F179176931478%2Fupdated-guide-to-posted-documents-regarding-use-of&amp;m=0" target="_blank"&gt;IC on the Record
Database&lt;/a&gt; enables users to conduct full-text searches of the Section 702
documents posted on IC on the Record. Newly released documents will be
regularly added to this database.&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/185819577533</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/185819577533</guid><pubDate>Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:13:07 -0400</pubDate><category>factsheet</category><category>transparency</category></item><item><title>ODNI Releases Annual Intelligence Community Transparency...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/8cf592ecdd7f24f1003b3139093b7d23/tumblr_pqrxy3kNZJ1serkyyo2_500.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; &lt;br/&gt;&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/cbff4c1f6209e8227a1b954df02f8306/tumblr_pqrxy3kNZJ1serkyyo1_500.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; &lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;b&gt;ODNI Releases Annual Intelligence Community Transparency Report&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;April 30, 2019&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today, consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), as amended (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)), and the Intelligence Community’s (IC) &lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/index.php/mission/our-values/341-transparency" target="_blank"&gt;Principles of Intelligence Transparency&lt;/a&gt;, we are releasing our &lt;a href="https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/search/statistical+transparency" target="_blank"&gt;sixth annual&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2019_ASTR_for_CY2018.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt; presenting statistics on how often the government uses certain national security authorities.
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Providing these statistics allows for an additional way to track the use of FISA authorities and National Security Letters (NSLs). The statistics also add further context regarding the IC’s rigorous and multi-layered oversight framework that safeguards the privacy of United States persons’ information and non-U.S. persons’ information acquired pursuant to these national security authorities. This report goes beyond the government’s statutory duty of providing statistics by further providing the public with detailed explanations as to how the IC uses its national security authorities. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“We’re again pleased to publish our annual statistical transparency report – the 6th annual report,” said Alex Joel, who leads the ODNI’s Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency. “As with past reports, this report provides statistics and explanations on how we use key authorities. Because it is important to understand these statistics in a broader context, we strive to explain that context clearly, which is challenging given the complexities of the authorities and the classified nature of these topics. We continue to look for ways to improve understanding of these authorities. Besides the new format and navigation of this year’s report, we are also pleased to be able to release, for the first time, the number of unique identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to Call Detail Records (CDRs) orders obtained per Section 501(b)(2)c.” &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Additional public information on national security authorities is available at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s website, &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov" target="_blank"&gt;www.dni.gov&lt;/a&gt;, the Intelligence Community’s public website, &lt;a href="https://www.intelligence.gov" target="_blank"&gt;www.intel.gov&lt;/a&gt;, and ODNI’s public Tumblr site, IC on the Record at &lt;a href="https://www.icontherecord.tumblr.com" target="_blank"&gt;IContheRecord.tumblr.com&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2019_ASTR_for_CY2018.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Statistical Transparency Report Regarding National Security Authorities Calendar Year 2018&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/184553467393</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/184553467393</guid><pubDate>Tue, 30 Apr 2019 12:19:20 -0400</pubDate><category>declassified</category><category>transparency</category><category>FISA</category><category>FISC</category><category>transparency report</category><category>ASTR</category></item><item><title>Argentina Declassification ProjectApril 12, 2019Today, at the...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/99e2b65f0d00d731e09f4c255ab22bcc/tumblr_pq06hrxGvr1serkyyo1_500.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; &lt;br/&gt;&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/317338e572638c91c2268c8faa0d83dc/tumblr_pq06hrxGvr1serkyyo2_r1_500.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; &lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Argentina Declassification Project&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;April 12, 2019&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today, at the request of the President of the United States, the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released a fourth
 and final tranche of records for the U.S. Declassification Project for 
Argentina.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today’s release marked the completion of the project, which 
originated with a personal request by Argentine President Mauricio Macri
 in 2016 to provide the Government of Argentina with declassified 
records related to human rights abuses committed during the military 
occupancy of Argentina between 1975 and 1984. Previous tranches of 
records were released in April 2016, December 2016, and April 2017.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The final release of records is the result of a multi-year effort 
that involved 16 departments and agencies of the U.S. federal 
government, including the Department of State, Central Intelligence 
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Archives and 
Records Administration, the archives of four presidential libraries, and
 several components of the Department of Defense.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A formal ceremony, including the official transfer of the records, 
took place this morning at the National Archives and Records Center in 
Washington, D.C.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Following the event, an online portal housing the entire collection 
of records declassified and released for the project launched at &lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/argentina-declassification-project" target="_blank"&gt;intel.gov/argentina&lt;/a&gt;. The online portal is hosted by ODNI and contains nearly 50,000 pages.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The project is the largest government-to-government declassification 
release in United States history. These newly declassified records 
represent a continued commitment by the United States to promote justice
 and reconciliation in Argentina, to underscore the importance of 
transparency, and to highlight our shared commitment to human rights.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;
To learn more about previously-released documents,
visit earlier IC on the Record posts from &lt;a href="https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/160054447173/argentina-declassification-project-april-27-2017" target="_blank"&gt;August 27, 2017&lt;/a&gt;,&lt;a href="https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/148650765298/argentina-declassification-project" target="_blank"&gt; August 8, 2016&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/154392365943/argentina-declassification-project-december-12" target="_blank"&gt;December 12, 2016&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_Archives.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - National Archives&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_CIA.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Central Intelligence Agency&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_ARMY.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (Army)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_DIA1.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (Defense Intelligence Agency Part 1)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_DIA2.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (Defense Intelligence Agency Part 2)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_DIA3.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (Defense Intelligence Agency Part 3)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_JS.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (Joint Staff)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_NAVY.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (Navy)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_OSD1.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (Office of the Secretary of Defense Part 1)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_OSD2.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (Office of the Secretary of Defense Part 2)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_OSD3.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (Office of the Secretary of Defense Part 3)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_OSD4.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (Office of the Secretary of Defense Part 4)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_SOUTHCOM.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (United States Southern Command)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOD_USAF.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Defense (United States Air Force)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_DOJ.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of Justice &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_FBI.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Federal Bureau of Investigation&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/argentina/ADP_State.zip" target="_blank"&gt;Argentina - Department of State&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/184201802948</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/184201802948</guid><pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2019 08:53:51 -0400</pubDate><category>argentina</category><category>declassified</category><category>President's Daily Brief</category><category>National Archives</category><category>CIA</category><category>NSA</category><category>DOD</category><category>DOJ</category><category>FBI</category><category>State</category></item><item><title>Release of
Joint Assessments of Section 702 ComplianceMarch 4,...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/99e2b65f0d00d731e09f4c255ab22bcc/tumblr_pnpd097b4X1serkyyo1_500.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;b&gt;Release of
Joint Assessments of Section 702 Compliance&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;March 4, 2019&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today the DNI, in consultation with the Department of Justice, is releasing in redacted form the 18th Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (“Joint Assessment”).  The DNI is releasing this semiannual assessment proactively, in keeping with the &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/how-we-work/transparency" target="_blank"&gt;Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the Intelligence Community (IC) (“IC’s Transparency Principles”).  &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (hereafter FAA), which was in effect during the reporting period of this 18th Joint Assessment required the Attorney General and the DNI to assess compliance with Section 702 procedures over a particular six month period and to submit such assessments semiannually to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and relevant congressional committees.  See then-codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881(l)(1); now codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881(m)(1) with the enactment of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 (hereafter FAA Reauthorization of 2017).  A joint team of experts (the Joint Oversight Team) from DOJ and ODNI conduct these assessments.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This Joint Assessment describes the extensive measures the Government has undertaken to ensure compliance with FISC-approved targeting and minimization procedures; to accurately identify, record, and correct errors; to take responsive actions to remove any erroneously obtained data; and to minimize the chances that mistakes will recur.  This Joint Assessment found that the agencies continue to implement the procedures in a manner that reflects a focused and concerted effort by IC personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702, including being appropriately focused on directing efforts at non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information.   &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Since the release of the &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Semiannual%20Assessment%20of%20Compliance%20with%20procedures%20and%20guidelines%20issued%20pursuant%20to%20Sect%20702%20of%20FISA.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;9th Joint Assessment&lt;/a&gt; (dated August 2013), in redacted form, on August 21, 2013, on IC on the Record, ODNI and DOJ have prepared subsequent Joint Assessments to enhance public readability, where feasible.  Consistent with the IC’s Transparency Principles, ODNI coordinated an extensive interagency review process to ensure the greatest transparency while protecting national security information, in order to enhance public understanding of the government’s implementation of Section 702.  Most recently, the 16th and 17th Joint Assessments were released in &lt;a href="https://tmblr.co/ZZQjsq2csUhoq" target="_blank"&gt;October 2018&lt;/a&gt;, adding to the previous releases of the 13th – 15th in &lt;a href="https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/155810963663/release-of-joint-assessments-of-section-702" target="_blank"&gt;January 2017&lt;/a&gt;; the 10th – 12th; and the 1st – 3rd Joint Assessments.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Below is today’s release, in redacted form, of the:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/18th_Joint_Assessment.pdf" target="_blank"&gt;18th Joint Assessment – dated October 2018, for reporting period December 2016 – May 2017 &lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/183214087048</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/183214087048</guid><pubDate>Mon, 04 Mar 2019 08:13:47 -0500</pubDate><category>section 702</category><category>declassified</category></item><item><title>DNI Coats Unveils the 2019 National Intelligence StrategyJanuary...</title><description>&lt;img src="https://64.media.tumblr.com/cde3415978852dff92f5102abca79460/tumblr_plskgwulsv1serkyyo1_500.png"/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;b&gt;DNI Coats Unveils the 2019 National Intelligence Strategy&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;January 22, 2019&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats unveiled the 2019 
National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) today. The NIS is the guiding 
strategy for the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and will drive the 
strategic direction for the Nation’s 17 IC elements for the next four 
years.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; The 2019 strategy is the fourth iteration for the NIS 
and seeks to make our nation more secure by driving the IC to be more 
integrated, agile, resilient, and innovative.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; “This strategy is
 based on the core principle of seeking the truth and speaking the truth
 to our policymakers and the American people in order to protect our 
country,” said Director Coats. “As a Community, we must become more 
agile, build and leverage partnerships, and apply the most advanced 
technologies in pursuit of unmatched insights. The 2019 NIS provides a 
roadmap to achieve this end.”&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; The NIS is one of the most 
important documents for the IC, as it aligns IC efforts to the National 
Security Strategy, sets priorities and objectives, and focuses resources
 on current and future operational, acquisition, and capability 
development decisions. Also, the NIS provides the IC with the 
opportunity to communicate those national priorities to the IC 
workforce, partners, oversight, customers, and fellow citizens. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; The 2019 NIS focuses on: &lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Integration - harnessing the full talent and tools of the IC by 
bringing the right information, to the right people, at the right time. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Innovation - making the IC more agile by swiftly enabling the right 
people and leveraging the right technology and using them efficiently to
 advance the highest priorities. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Partnerships - leveraging strong, unique, and valuable partnerships to support and enable national security outcomes. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Transparency - earning and upholding the trust and faith of the IC’s customers and the American people. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;The NIS was developed in response to rapid advances made by our 
adversaries and the ODNI’s recognition that the IC needs to change to 
more effectively respond to those challenges. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;br/&gt; In his 2019 NIS 
opening message, the DNI states, “We face a significant challenge in the
 domestic and global environment; we must be ready to meet 21st century 
challenges and to recognize emerging threats and opportunities. To 
navigate today’s turbulent and complex strategic environment, we must do
 things differently.”&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; To guide the IC in facing these 
challenges, the NIS identifies and explains the IC’s objectives - both 
what the Community must accomplish (mission objectives) and what 
capabilities the Community must build in order to do so (enterprise 
objectives). &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; The seven mission objectives are 1) strategic 
intelligence; 2) anticipatory intelligence; 3) current operations 
intelligence; 4) cyber threat intelligence; 5) counterterrorism; 6) 
counterproliferation; and 7) counterintelligence and security.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; 
The seven enterprise objectives are 1) integrated mission management; 2)
 integrated business management; 3) people; 4) innovation; 5) 
information sharing and safeguarding; 6) partnerships; and 7) privacy, 
civil liberties, and transparency. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; “These objectives will 
allow the IC to continue the crucial work of supporting our senior 
policymakers, warfighters, and democracy while increasing transparency 
and protecting privacy and civil liberties,” said Director Coats. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;
 The NIS includes the seven Principles of Professional Ethics for the 
Intelligence Community: 1) mission; 2) truth; 3) lawfulness; 4) 
integrity; 5) stewardship; 6) excellence; and 7) diversity. The NIS also
 includes the Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the 
Intelligence Community.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; “Transparency will be our hallmark, and
 I cannot stress this enough - this is not a limitation on us,” said 
Director Coats. “Transparency will make us stronger. It is the right 
thing to do, across the board. This is the reason we publish the NIS at 
the unclassified level.”&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt; The Office of the Director of National
 Intelligence oversees the coordination and integration of the 17 
federal organizations that make up the Intelligence Community. The DNI 
sets the priorities for and manages the implementation of the National 
Intelligence Program, which is the IC’s budget. Additionally, the DNI is
 the principal advisor to the President and the National Security 
Council on all intelligence issues related to national security. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;National Intelligence Strategy 2019 DNI.gov Link - &lt;a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf?utm_source=Press%20Release&amp;utm_medium=Email&amp;utm_campaign=NIS_2019" target="_blank"&gt;https://go.usa.gov/xEZsA&lt;/a&gt; &lt;br/&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;NIS @ A Glance Intel.gov Link - &lt;a href="https://go.usa.gov/xEZsF" target="_blank"&gt;https://go.usa.gov/xEZsF&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description><link>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/182245838138</link><guid>https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/182245838138</guid><pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:00:32 -0500</pubDate><category>NIS</category><category>national intelligence stratetgy</category><category>ODNI</category><category>national security</category><category>IC</category><category>intelligence community</category><category>NIS2019</category></item></channel></rss>
