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SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE REFORM

PROGRESS REPORT
CALENDAR YEAR 2016

   
• DNI CLAPPER’S INTRODUCTION
• OVERVIEW
• ENHANCING PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
• LIMITING SIGINT COLLECTION AND USE  «
• INSTITUTIONALIZING TRANSPARENCY

• CY 2014 REPORT | CY 2015 REPORT

LIMITING SIGINT COLLECTION AND USE

   The National Intelligence Priorities Framework

The National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) is the primary mechanism by which national intelligence priorities are communicated to Intelligence Community agencies to enable them to prioritize collection and analytic activities, including the use of SIGINT. The NIPF establishes priorities over the upcoming 12-18 months. These priorities address a diverse range of threats, and a description of these threats is published by the Director of National Intelligence in the annual release of the Worldwide Threat Assessment.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence and policymakers from IC departments and agencies examined and validated each priority with respect to the anticipated intelligence value from SIGINT coverage. This process ensures that SIGINT is used in support of valid national security objectives.

New in 2016

During the past year, ODNI completed its comprehensive NIPF review, which included the input of senior policymakers designated in PPD-28, additional policymakers from across the U.S. government, and senior IC and Department of Defense officials. With the input of policymakers, the ODNI assisted the National Security Council staff in leading a review of the President’s Intelligence Priorities, which resulted in a revision to certain tiers of NIPF priorities. Further, the ODNI held a zero-based review of other tiers of the NIPF. Additionally, ODNI added training about appropriate SIGINT targeting under PPD-28 as part of its NIPF training program for IC officers, during which ODNI conducted over 40 outreach on-site training events in 2016.


   Refined Process on SIGINT Targeting

PPD-28 directed changes to the process for selecting targets for SIGINT collection in response to intelligence priorities, to ensure that special concerns unique to SIGINT collection were considered alongside other risks and benefits. The heads of policy departments and agencies must now review and approve sensitive SIGINT collection decisions consistent with the requirements of PPD-28. More specifically, policymakers must now evaluate SIGINT collection priorities with respect to its national security and foreign policy value; the risks to our economic, political, and security relations with foreign countries if such collection activities were revealed; and privacy interests. This process ensures that those who are best positioned to identify the strategic risks associated with certain intelligence collection – senior policymakers – provide comprehensive oversight of SIGINT collection activities. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence works with the Intelligence Community to help ensure that SIGINT activities remain consistent with any collection restrictions established by senior policymakers.

The ODNI facilitates a process to ensure policymakers regularly review and revalidate the targets for SIGINT collection. During this process, policymakers are presented with collection profiles, and they assess the risk and value of the IC’s collection. They assess the value of SIGINT collection on targets related to all national priorities. In cases where policymakers determine that the risk of collecting the intelligence outweighs the value of the collection, targeting restrictions can be established to terminate or limit collection and dissemination of the information.

New in 2016

ODNI continued to ensure that policymakers review the sensitivity and intelligence value of SIGINT targeting through its annual review process. In addition to coordinating an annual review to revalidate the targets for SIGINT collection, the ODNI continues to work with departments and agencies to conduct a quarterly review to identify and address issues, sensitivities and risks associated with SIGINT targets.


   Limits on Use of SIGINT Collected in Bulk

Section 2 of PPD-28 articulated limits on the use of SIGINT collected in bulk. PPD-28 limits Intelligence Community (IC) use of SIGINT collected in bulk for six specific purposes: (i) to counter espionage and other threats and activities of foreign powers or intelligence services against the U.S. and its interests; (ii) counterterrorism; (iii) counter-proliferation; (iv) cybersecurity; (v) to detect and counter threats to U.S. or allied armed forces or other U.S. or allied personnel; and (vi) to combat transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion.

New in 2016

In 2016, senior policymakers re-evaluated these six criteria for the purpose of the annual SIGINT review under PPD-28, and recommended that the current list of permissible uses be maintained.

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